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THAILAND
Thaksin Survives Yet Disquiet Floods 
the Kingdom
Nicholas Farrelly 
During 2011 the unresolved legacies of recent political conflict continued to 
overshadow prospects for reconciliation in Thailand. The pivot for the current 
troubles is the coup of 19 September 2006 when the army leadership, in 
concert with palace insiders, deposed the electorally successful government of 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.1 The coup was designed to dismantle the 
Thaksin juggernaut and eradicate his supposedly malign, even dictatorial, influence 
from national life. The worry, both then and now, is that Thaksin can disrupt the 
careful plans — economic, political, royal, etc. — of other factions among the 
country’s elite. Thaksin, with his telecommunications fortune and unique track 
record of marshalling electoral support, has been portrayed as the enemy of national 
unity. Since the coup there have been more than five years of jousting between 
Thaksin and his allies, on the one hand, and senior members of the military, Privy 
Council, judiciary, and bureaucracy on the other. In 2011 the ghosts of the 2006 
extra-constitutional intervention, and the ineptitude and violence that followed, 
returned to haunt the coup makers. With the 2011 election there is a final popular 
verdict on the coup and its aftermath. It is a bleak one for those who had worked 
towards Thaksin’s downfall. 
Remarkably, Thaksin has survived. With the Pheua Thai Party’s resounding 
election victory on 3 July 2011, and its leadership of the country’s new coalition 
government, his ignominious exile from Thailand, and from official political 
activities, may be coming to an end. All efforts to purge him have failed. By a 
large margin, Thaksin remains the most electorally successful politician in the 
country’s history and the events of 2011 reinforce his singular claim to a popular 
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mandate.2 With the triumph of his sister, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, 
Thaksin is once again in a decisive position. And while Yingluck is commonly 
described as a “political novice”,3 and many doubt her abilities,4 she has proved 
a very effective proxy for Thaksin and his brand of politics. The conundrum now 
facing Thaksin’s political opponents is that their policies and personalities, as 
represented by the Democrat Party and the New Politics Party, among other party 
political movements, do not garner widespread electoral support. In 2011 even the 
quirky “vote no” campaign of the hard line anti-Thaksin groups failed to make 
much of an impression.5 The strength of Thaksin’s base in the rural provinces 
of the north and northeast, but also in the predominately working class areas on 
Bangkok’s periphery, is clear. Efforts to stigmatize him have largely failed.6 The 
evidence from 2011 is that support remains robust for Thaksin personally and 
more broadly for the brand of populism, and patronage, he represents.7
Nonetheless, the role of anti-Thaksin military, royal, judicial, and bureaucratic 
networks is a complicating factor. While they may enjoy only modest popular 
support for their political agendas, these institutions are potentially powerful 
centres for undermining the Pheua Thai-led government and its electoral success. 
The army chief, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, and senior palace officials, such 
as the Privy Council chairman, General Prem Tinsulanonda, among others, are 
deeply enmeshed in efforts to neuter Thaksin’s influence.8 They remain wary of 
Thaksin, speak out against his corrupt and disruptive history, and likely harbour 
an appetite to challenge him again in the years ahead. In this context, soon after 
the 2011 election Singapore-based political analyst Pavin Chachavalpongpun 
went so far as to argue that “[i]t is time for Madame Prime Minister to act like 
a true soldier — fire the one [General Prayuth] who has caused great damage 
to Thai interests.”9 Yingluck has yet to take that advice and one explanation for 
her hesitancy is that the freedom of action of senior military figures is greatly 
diminished by the electoral support she commands. Furthermore, since the 
violent crackdown on Thaksin-aligned Red Shirt protestors in April–May 2010 
(when ninety-one people were killed), both the palace and the army have been 
increasingly targeted for their anti-democratic tendencies.10 Any future political 
interventions outside the electoral and parliamentary process (what Thais often 
call nok rabob) would risk generating even more significant conflict in what is 
already a profoundly disquieted society. 
The year 2011 ends, however, with a different preoccupation. There is a huge 
clean-up, rehabilitation, and reconstruction effort under way after the devastating 
floods that covered large portions of the country in the period July–November. 
This crisis has shaped the early public perception of Yingluck’s government, which 
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has only been in power since August. In the context of the Pheua Thai Party’s 
election victory, and the optimism that followed, the floods are a major setback. In 
response, there is already speculation that a significant Cabinet reshuffle, and the 
re-entry of politicians banned from high office after the 2006 coup, is planned for 
2012.11 Meanwhile, the relative strengths and weaknesses of factions among the 
Thai elite are muddied by the response to the floods: all sides have been openly 
criticized for perceived inadequacies. Through this watery prism we can reflect on 
recent developments in Thai politics, foreign relations, and military matters, and 
must also consider the looming royal succession. Even though the year saw little 
political violence in Bangkok, the country remains primed for further conflict. There 
were, with this in mind, few positive developments around the most explosive 
issues facing Thailand: the simmering conflict in the southernmost provinces and 
the role of the royal family after King Bhumibol Adulyadej dies.
Election 2011
To begin the year, the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva — which 
came to power in December 2008 when it benefited from a judicially mandated 
dissolution of the Thaksin-aligned People Power Party — remained equivocal about 
the timing of an election to determine a new government.12 Smouldering indications 
from top military circles suggested that alternative paths, including entirely non-
electoral ones, were possible. Prime Minister Abhisit was naturally seeking a viable 
way to continue in power after weathering the tumult of April–May 2010 when 
his government teetered on the brink of collapse during violent demonstrations in 
central Bangkok. However, his Democrat Party is historically weak at the ballot 
box and has only won once since the advent of regular democratic elections in 
1992. Many Democrat Party critics rejoice in explaining that it has lost the last 
six elections in a row. Once the election was announced, the army chief, General 
Prayuth, encouraged Thais not to choose the “same” politicians and advised that 
they should instead opt for “good people”.13 He clearly had Prime Minister Abhisit 
on his list of “good people” but the general’s advice was widely ignored. 
The seven-week election campaign, from May to July 2011, which pitted 
Abhisit against Yingluck, was fiercely contested across the length and breadth of 
the country. Yingluck began with very little political campaigning experience: it 
was only on 16 May, one week after the election was called, that she was even 
made the Pheua Thai Party’s top-ranked party list candidate.14 During the campaign 
she was attacked for this perceived inexperience and her lack of earlier interest 
in national political issues. However, she quickly gained a level of respect for 
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her campaigning in traditional pro-Thaksin strongholds in the rural north and 
northeast. The prospect of electing Thailand’s first female Prime Minister also 
helped her cause. 
Crucially, during the campaign there was no effort to imply that Yingluck 
would govern independent of her brother’s ambitions. Instead, Thaksin’s strategists 
worked diligently to insist that Yingluck represented the style of electorally 
successful politics, sometimes referred to disparagingly as “populist”, which was the 
hallmark of the pre-coup, Thai Rak Thai era.15 The striking family resemblance to 
Thaksin never hurt her chances. And in the all-important rural constituencies where 
the spoils of political power are decided, she appeared comfortable and relaxed. 
Going into the 2011 poll Yingluck, and her supporters, took some confidence from 
the fact that in the 2001, 2005, and 2007 elections they had out-performed all 
of their political opponents. Their only defeats in the past decade came through 
non-electoral mechanisms: military and judicial interventions. 
For that reason the election of 2011 cannot be viewed as a purely political 
contest. It was also a contest to further define the history of the post-coup period, 
especially the bitter episodes of violent street confrontation. In 2008, 2009, and 
2010, Thailand experienced violence around the street mobilizations of the Red 
Shirt (largely pro-Thaksin) and Yellow Shirt (implacably anti-Thaksin) political 
movements. It was the Red Shirts that felt the wrath of the 2010 crackdown by 
Thai security forces under the command of General Prayuth and Prime Minister 
Abhisit. Determining responsibility for that violence, and perhaps punishing those 
considered to have acted with excessive force, has become a core demand for 
Red Shirt activists.
In the context of this long-running social conflict, and his irretrievably 
damaged reputation as one of Thailand’s rare “clean-skin” politicians, Abhisit 
failed to present a strong enough alternative. His economic policies wilted in 
the face of Yingluck’s aggressive, populist tendencies. During the campaign, 
she sought to reintroduce the pro-poor policies which are widely considered the 
hallmark of Thaksin-style politics. Even where both Abhisit and Yingluck were 
calling for similar approaches, such as an increase to the minimum wage, Pheua 
Thai took a consistently more radical line. It was therefore not surprising when 
the early results on 3 July suggested a landslide for Yingluck. The final result 
was not quite as stark but, nonetheless, Pheua Thai became only the second 
political party in Thai history to win a majority sufficient to govern independent 
of any coalition partners. It won 265 seats, while the Democrat Party could only 
manage 159. In terms of the overall vote, Pheua Thai garnered 15,744,190 and 
the Democrats 11,433,762. Abhisit’s message of continuity and stability failed 
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to convince the millions of voters who remained loyal, in 2011, to the political 
juggernaut of Thaksin Shinawatra. Within days a new coalition government had 
been configured, bringing Pheua Thai into an arrangement with four other parties 
to command 296 of the 500 seats in parliament.
Foreign Relations
These domestic political events had ramifications in terms of Thai foreign 
policy. In 2011 Thailand’s foreign relations were defined by two very different 
governments. For the first half of the year foreign policy under Prime Minister 
Abhisit was punctuated by violent confrontation with Cambodia, and the ongoing 
effort to track Thaksin around the world spearheaded by Foreign Minister Kasit 
Piromya. The brinksmanship with Cambodia, which was centred on the disputed 
border demarcation around the ancient Preah Vihear temple complex, led to a 
significant breakdown in the bilateral relationship. Early in the year there were 
a number of clashes between the security forces of the two countries. These left 
around forty dead. For the Abhisit government, such a showdown served the 
associated purpose of highlighting the reputedly close ties between former Prime 
Minister Thaksin and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.16 The conflict with 
Cambodia was a grave concern to those who worried it would be used to justify 
yet another military intervention in Thai politics. Thailand’s ultra-nationalists, 
especially remnants of the faded Yellow Shirt street movement, hoped, perhaps 
naively, that due to the conflict with Cambodia the Abhisit government would be 
forced to resign. Some anticipated a hard line military caretaker regime taking 
control to punish the Cambodians and to more vigorously wage the ongoing 
battle against Thaksin. However, Thai foreign policy did not ultimately have 
any such impact on the custodianship of political power.
With her resounding domestic mandate, Yingluck has, since the election, 
largely prioritized national issues. To be fair, the most pressing problems, especially 
the flood crisis, have not merited much international dealing. Yingluck’s first 
international trip, in September, was to Brunei Darussalam. However, late in the 
year she did travel abroad on a number of other occasions. In December she 
met with Myanmar’s pro-democracy figurehead, Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as 
the country’s President, Thein Sein. Pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi and Yingluck 
standing in front of a portrait of King Bhumibol were presented in newspapers 
around the world. She has also enjoyed brief audiences with the leaders of other 
Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In 
some quarters, Yingluck has been criticized for “her poor command of the English 
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language”; in terms of foreign policy acumen, unflattering contrasts with Prime 
Minister Abhisit have been made.17
Post-poll Politics
Certainly there are those who miss Abhisit’s gentle eloquence and natural flair 
for international politics; Yingluck (and Thaksin) will never match him in that 
regard. After his defeat, Abhisit addressed the Thai people as outgoing Prime 
Minister with an eye to history’s verdict. In a conciliatory speech, but one which 
included key stanzas designed to defend his actions over the past years, he 
insisted that “[t]he general election under our parliamentary system is another step 
forward in Thailand’s democracy. It is aimed to move our county towards 
reconciliation.”18 Then, on 5 August, a month after the election, the new parliament 
voted to install Yingluck as Thailand’s twenty-eighth Prime Minister.19 In her 
first policy statement to parliament she set out short- and long-term goals, and 
set a different tone to Abhisit. For Yingluck’s new government the most urgent 
policies were fostering reconciliation, suppressing corruption, promoting integrated 
water management, accelerating efforts to restore peace in the three southernmost 
provinces, and promoting cooperation with neighbouring countries.20 Yingluck 
emphasized the need to provide economic support because of inflationary pressures 
and invoked Thai Rak Thai–era policies such as increasing the availability of 
credit to farmers. Moreover, her Cabinet included close Thaksin allies such as 
Police Captain Chalerm Ubumrung (Deputy Prime Minister) and Police General 
Kowit Wattana (Deputy Prime Minister). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Surapong 
Tovichakchaikul, and the Minister of Defence, General Yuthasak Sasiprapha, are 
also both long-term Thaksin backers.21
This effort to bring experienced officials and ministers, and old Thaksin, 
allies, into the government dampened some of the most serious criticisms of 
Yingluck and her team. Considerable effort was made to present a coherent and 
attractive policy platform, and to introduce a well-regarded senior leadership team. 
Given the multitude of political challenges facing the country, Yingluck requires 
their counsel. But even this team struggled in the face of the events that swiftly 
followed their election to power.
The flood crisis in the second half of 2011 tested Yingluck, Thaksin and 
Pheua Thai in ways they may not have expected. Unusual levels of precipitation 
throughout 2011 meant that at the peak of the wet season huge amounts of water 
flowed through northern and central Thailand. Flooding in fifty-eight provinces 
caused significant disruption, especially in areas such as Ayutthaya, where large 
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parts of the country’s manufacturing sector are based. Complaints about the 
government’s handling of this difficult period have been as obvious as they have 
been inevitable.22 This disrupted period, unwelcome for the Yingluck government, 
caused months of consternation and developed into another opportunity for political 
point-scoring. The government’s handling of the floods was widely criticized, 
especially by those who are naturally unsympathetic to Thaksin-style politics. In 
many areas government assistance was reportedly almost non-existent and what 
resources were available were quickly diminished by the overwhelming demand. 
To compensate for this perceived inaction, Yingluck opted not to attend the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit held in the United States in November, 
citing the floods crisis. High-powered committees were also established to help 
with the flood relief effort, and by October and November the government was 
better mobilizing personnel and supplies to help those affected. Since the flood 
waters receded during November the reconstruction phase has seen continued 
political manoeuvring and jousting. Yingluck has promised compensation for those 
impacted by the floods. The management of such handouts will become another 
battleground in the year ahead.
Economic Resilience
In the context of the disruptions caused by recent political conflict, Thailand’s 
economy has remained relatively strong. Forecasts for 2011 were, at the start of 
the year, quite positive. These suggested that Thailand would be in a position to 
grow at more than 3.5 per cent.23 By the end of the year, this was downgraded to 
1 per cent.24 This modest number follows a growth rate of 7.8 per cent in 2010, a 
contraction of –2.3 per cent in 2009, and growth of 2.5 per cent in 2008. Overall, 
the Thai economy has proven quite resilient in the face of domestic political 
turmoil. Tourist arrivals have remained strong and in 2011 a record of over 
18 million foreigners visited the country.25And given global economic jitters since 
2008, Thailand’s performance has, in these years, proven robust. In recognition 
of this economic strength, in July 2011 the World Bank upgraded Thailand from 
a lower-middle-income country to an upper-middle-income country. It now joins 
Malaysia as the second Southeast Asian economy in that category.
Nonetheless, 2011 saw a number of other economic challenges, some of which 
will remain important for years to come. The first challenge was the devastating 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan. This served to undermine the prospects of one 
of Thailand’s key trading partners. It led to a contraction in the Thai economy 
in the second quarter of the year.26 The disruption of global automobile supply 
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chains was especially challenging at that time. The second significant economic 
calamity in 2011 accompanied the floods. These were most destructive in the central 
plains, especially in the heavily industrialized province of Ayutthaya. Agricultural 
production was also hit hard. The full economic impact of the floods will not be 
known for some time. The challenge is to manage a rapid recovery, especially in 
the globally important, supply-change focussed elements of Thailand’s economy. 
New investment in flood mitigation efforts may ultimately help to generate a steep 
spike in economic growth. Such investment will no doubt be fiercely contested 
at the level of national politics.
In 2011 the election campaign emphasized a long list of economic topics, 
including increasing the minimum wage, investing in major infrastructure 
projects, lowering corporate taxes, and reintroducing a rice mortgage policy. 
Even though Thailand has continued its strong performance for most of the past 
four years, there is widespread popular trepidation about the country’s prospects. 
Economic issues remain electorally potent, and on the campaign trail they may 
have been decisive. Both the Pheua Thai and Democrat parties endeavoured to 
appeal to the interests of voters struggling to maintain living standards with 
rising prices. The legacy of the earlier Thai Rak Thai–era, when Thailand’s 
economy experienced a sustained boom, has not been forgotten. As a result, 
the CEO-style policies associated with the Shinawatra family still garner much 
voter support.
Thaksin and his Opponents
Curiously, the major political developments for Thailand in 2011 centre on a 
figure who has not even spent a day in the kingdom during the year. Former 
Prime Minister Thaksin has manoeuvred into a position, buttressed by his Pheau 
Thai Party’s undiminished electoral support, where he can now look forward to 
future opportunities to determine political outcomes. With their justification for 
the 2006 coup in tatters, and the resounding rejection by the Thai electorate 
ringing in their ears, the military, bureaucratic, and palace elites who remain 
so aggressively opposed to his activities have been forced to reconsider 
their options. 
Importantly, during 2011 the notion that some may have overstepped the limits 
of good judgement with the 2006 coup began to take on ever more coherence.27 
It has been quietly implied that even the Queen, long regarded as one of the 
most active anti-Thaksin campaigners, has decided that a more prudent, even 
conciliatory, approach is needed. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding any anxieties 
10a Nicholas.indd   308 4/11/12   4:01:00 PM
Thailand: Thaksin Survives Yet Disquiet Floods the Kingdom 309
that may have developed about the coup, Thaksin remains the most divisive figure 
in national life, and the level of animosity that his continued political activity 
generates cannot be underestimated. While 2011 did not see the mass anti-Thaksin 
protests which featured so prominently in the period 2005–8, there were still many 
efforts to dent his credibility, especially once it became clear that a Pheua Thai 
election win was likely.28
It is the 2011 election victory which could prove instrumental in the 
resurrection of his political fortunes. In a highly symbolic move, in October the 
Yingluck government reissued Thaksin’s passport, which had been taken from him 
in April 2011 by the Democrat-led coalition government.29 Since then, prominent 
Democrat Party spokesmen have called for the impeachment of the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister: they are considered to have abused their powers in reissuing 
Thaksin’s travel document. These efforts to destabilize the government, and disrupt 
its efforts to reintegrate Thaksin into political life in 2012, are a further indication 
of the profound and unresolved challenges that Thailand faces. Many anti-Thaksin 
campaigners still consider him a fugitive from Thai justice: he was sentenced in 
absentia in 2008 to two years imprisonment for a controversial Bangkok land deal. 
Furthermore, in May 2010 the Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant after the 
Department of Special Investigation prepared terrorism charges against Thaksin 
for his alleged role in the April–May 2010 Red Shirt street protests.30 In 2011 
there were sporadic efforts to accuse him of terrorism, although by the end of 
the year the Department of Special Investigation was forced to deny that it had 
“erased” the relevant Thaksin file.31
Military Matters
In terms of Thaksin’s key opponents, it is the senior ranks of the military that have 
been most unwilling to countenance his increasingly active role. To complicate 
matters, during 2011 the Thai military faced three major challenges which all 
required substantial tactical, strategic, and political investments. From the dispute 
with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple complex and surrounding territory, 
to the ongoing civil conflict in southern Thailand, and the need for resources to 
be devoted to stewarding political issues in Bangkok’s politics, the military had 
a busy year. 
Preah Vihear
The catalyst for the recent conflict between Thailand and Cambodia is the dispute 
over the demarcation of the border between the countries in the vicinity of the 
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Preah Vihear temple complex. Going back to 2008 there have been periods of 
heightened tension and occasional clashes between the two countries. However, in 
early 2011, moves along the border — precipitated largely by domestic political 
priorities in both Thailand and Cambodia — led to sabre-rattling and then a much 
more significant level of violence. This conflict with Cambodia saw thousands 
of Thai troops square off with a sizeable Cambodian contingent. There were a 
number of engagements in February, and while tensions then eased, there was 
another major flare-up from April to early May. While the numbers of casualties 
on the Cambodian side are difficult to verify, around sixteen Thais died in the 
fighting, with scores wounded.
For the government of then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the conflict 
with Cambodia provided an opportunity to show leadership in the crucial period 
before the July election. Instead of strengthening popular support, however, the 
conflict may have served to raise questions about the judgement of the Democrat-
led coalition and its allies in the Thai army. Many Thais were understandably 
curious about the justification for the showdown and some even queried whether 
a conflict with Cambodia was in the national interest. Some others no doubt 
were uncomfortable with the nationalist frenzy which accompanied the effort 
to challenge a much smaller and weaker adversary. Thai air power, artillery, 
and armour were always on standby. It was not an episode which reflected well 
on the government or its diplomatic capacities. It was finally resolved by the 
election of Yingluck, and also by the intervention of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, and particularly Indonesia, which held the chair of the regional 
body in 2011. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, was especially 
active in brokering the final truce.
Southern Thailand
Throughout the year the largest military and security operation has occurred in 
Southern Thailand. The restive provinces of Yala, Patani, and Narathiwat have 
seen ongoing fighting between government forces and a range of adversaries. 
It is often unclear exactly who is fighting and with what purpose. It is now 
ten years since the most recent period of instability in these provinces began 
and the Thai Government is seemingly no closer to a resolution, either through 
a compromise with local residents or through a decisive military or political 
victory. The prospect of such a victory remains remote because the Thai 
Government is waging a counter-insurgency campaign under conditions where 
insurgency is only one, perhaps small, component of the violence. The government 
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also faces increasingly well-organized criminal groups, some of whom are 
apparently collaborating with government security forces. It is a messy situation 
which defies straightforward analysis. 
But the Thai Government or, more precisely, the army seems to have an 
appetite for almost perpetual deployment. A generation of Thai security officials, 
from the army, police, and civilian agencies, have now been blooded in the southern 
conflict. Their efforts to remain engaged are now as much personal and economic 
as they are tactical or strategic. The conflict has become tied to the prestige, and 
budgets, of the security forces and they will likely continue to maintain a large 
presence in the southernmost provinces on an almost permanent basis. A perpetual 
conflict of this nature is difficult for any government to manage, and especially 
so for Yingluck whose Pheua Thai Party has little natural political support in the 
provinces of Southern Thailand. 
Bangkok Politics
For the army leadership, arguably the most important issue in 2011 was the need 
to be engaged with national politics before and after the July election. Key army 
generals remain deeply concerned about the potential for Thaksin to destabilize 
plans for the post-Bhumibol royal succession. As a result, in 2011 General Prayuth 
continued the army’s campaign to remain an active political player, especially 
regarding the defence of the country’s sacred trinity: “nation, religion, king”. His 
statements in the lead-up to the July election were aimed at inserting the military 
into political discussions and reminding voters of the military’s self-appointed role 
as guardian of morality, Thainess, and royal prestige. 
Royal Intrigue
In 2011 the royal succession was a key, but often unspoken, issue. It is the 
proverbial elephant in the room for a country which has become accustomed, over 
King Bhumibol’s reign, to the role of a monarchy which continues to influence 
many political outcomes. The King’s health has been a major issue since September 
2009, and throughout the years since he has been largely confined to Siriraj 
Hospital in Bangkok. Milestones, such as the sixty-fifth anniversary of his reign 
in June and his eighty-fourth birthday in December, were recent opportunities for 
outpourings of national affection.32 Devotional activities have become increasingly 
fervent, especially as the King’s ability to directly influence political events has 
faded. However, his aura has continued to grow. 
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Indeed, as an apparition, hovering somewhere between the living and the 
dead, he is immensely powerful, with unrivalled symbolic and charismatic potency. 
It is important to remember that Bhumibol is, after more than six decades on 
the throne, the only king that more than 92 per cent of the Thai population have 
known during their lifetimes.33As Andrew Walker has argued, the King’s status 
detracts from the potential for other figures, including those in the palace, to 
develop their own political personalities.34 Thailand faces some decisive months 
and years now that the fault lines around the future role of the royal family 
have become increasingly clear. Efforts to buttress the reputation and prospects 
of individual members of the family continue; although there are many who are 
clearly not persuaded that the challenges can be easily resolved.35
Most worrying, for many observers, is the use of the lèse-majesté law to 
punish political dissenters. In late 2011 a spate of new cases emerged, and some 
old cases ended with lengthy prison sentences for those convicted of “defaming, 
insulting or threatening” senior members of the royal family. One case that 
provoked particular outrage centred on Ampon “Uncle SMS” Tangnoppakul who 
was sentenced, in November, to twenty years imprisonment for allegedly sending 
text messages deemed defamatory.36 With such examples, Thailand now faces a 
future where its international reputation, built on tolerance and a modicum of 
political plurality, is under threat.37 Widespread media reporting highlighted the 
fearsome deployment of the lèse-majesté law against dissenters and those who, 
unluckily, become its targets. Internationally, Thailand also faced growing disquiet 
about the heavy-handed approach to enforcing the lèse-majesté law. To make 
matters worse, temperate criticism from the United States and United Nations, 
among others, led to howls of outrage among some pro-monarchy groups. 
There is, importantly, still no high level support for efforts to reform the 
lèse-majesté law and in public there is a chorus of elite backing, even from the 
Pheua Thai Party, for its continued enforcement. Late in the year, Deputy Prime 
Minister Chalerm Ubamrung declared that those who call for the reform of the 
law are bringing on “chaos”.38 He even asked, “Don’t they have any jobs to go 
to?” A senior Foreign Ministry spokesman insisted that “the lèse-majesté law is 
not aimed at curbing people’s rights to freedom of opinion and expression nor the 
legitimate exercise of academic freedom, including debates about the monarchy 
as an institution”.39
With the cover of such pronouncements, some of the most uncompromising 
supporters of the lèse-majesté law’s continued deployment come from the Pheua 
Thai government’s senior ranks. They clearly see the potential for their own royalist 
credentials to be bolstered by efforts to target political dissenters, especially those 
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on the republican fringe. In this respect, the critical, anti-monarchy sentiments 
among rank-and-file Red Shirt activists are not always replicated at the highest 
rungs of Red Shirt/Pheua Thai politics. This is a contradiction which may prove 
destabilizing as some Red Shirts feel that their leadership does not adequately 
reflect the interests and priorities for which they fought, and died, in April–May 
2010. Indeed, the lèse-majesté crackdowns have another implication for Thai 
politics. They show that the use of repressive measures is not the monopoly of 
any one side in the recent conflicts.
Conclusion: Stalemates and Instability
After the recent years of open political conflict, many Thais are understandably 
content to see the country’s leaders disavow further confrontation. A grand 
compromise where Thaksin can work with his opponents from the military, royal, 
judicial, and bureaucratic networks would likely prove very appealing to those 
millions of Thais who have no stomach for further bloodshed or disruption.40 
Indications from 2011 are that such an arrangement is slowly taking shape and 
that the largely pro-royalist public orientation of Yingluck’s government has been 
warmly welcomed by those who worried about the potentially vindictive flavour of 
pro-Thaksin politicians. This makes outright confrontation between pro- and anti-
Thaksin forces less likely in the short-term. While it opts to take less provocative 
paths, and disavows more radical Red Shirt proposals, the Yingluck government 
may be able to steer itself through to the next scheduled election in 2015. In terms 
of Thai political calculations, that is an eternity. By that time King Bhumibol may 
no longer be on the throne and many other things will have changed.
In the meantime, we can conclude that 2011 has been yet another tumultuous 
year. The legacies of recent political battles — all products of the unconsummated 
efforts of the 2006 coup makers to destroy Thaksin and his popularity — still 
echo loudly. There is even a call, originating from a controversial group of 
Thammasat University academics, for the nullification of the legal effects of 
that coup.41 But this is exactly the type of polarizing move which Yingluck 
has consciously avoided during her first months as Prime Minister. In the final 
stages of King Bhumibol’s lengthy reign, the Pheua Thai government has thus 
far looked to provide stability without unduly jeopardizing the interests of those 
palace and military elites who feel threatened by the capacity of Thaksin to 
disrupt their plans.
But there are now other Thais, heavily politicized by recent conflicts, 
especially the Red Shirt protests of April–May 2010, who feel that the Yingluck 
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government has been insufficiently radical in terms of social and economic 
policy. Her government could face a republican backlash from those who continue 
to feel disenfranchised by the politics of the country’s leading institutions.42 
Under these circumstances the threats remain immense, even existential, and the 
prospect of further calamity or violence is very real. The stalemates between 
the Thaksin side and the coup makers have already broken on a number of 
occasions. It is through his electoral success, and talent for populist flourishes, 
that Thaksin could choose to destabilize, or even destroy, the forces arrayed 
against him. The year 2011 demonstrated that Thaksin and his juggernaut still 
mean political business.
Notes
This article benefits from discussions with many individuals, especially colleagues at the 
Australian National University, Canberra, but the author bears all responsibility for the 
final assessments of Thailand in 2011. I would, at the same time, like to offer special 
thanks to Dr Andrew Walker for his mentorship over many years studying Thai society 
and politics.
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